So a copy retaining consciousness would not help you live forever?So long as the original dies, the copy-process allows eternal consciousness, like the basic theory behind the Cylon resurrection ships in BSG.
Consciousness is an expression of the brain. When your brain dies, so does your consciousness, no matter how many copies exist of your brain. There is no way to "transfer" your consciousness to something else. This is why uploading won't help you. A copy of you is merely another you, with its own consciousness. Whether the old you lives or dies does not matter in the least, and certainly doesn't "transfer" your consciousness anywhere.
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I disagree. Consciousness is an expression of processes, an amalgam of electrical and chemical events sequencing in a particular order, mapping and re-mapping based on input. Consciousness is just a form of information, and if that information can be duplicated and the mapping processes continued, it doesn't matter whether the archecture is organic or inorganic, or whether or not it is transferred from one information processing platform (organic brain) to another (information system). We know that the organic brain developes and that its structure changes over time and that the changes are even event-based, so it's not without the realm of possibility to grow a hosting brain that in every way is a duplicate of the original. In 2013 people are routinely revived who just 100 years ago would have been absolutely 'dead' and buried by weeks's end. With a future technology capable of duplicating both memory and the individual processes unique to a particular consciousness, a person could 'continue' in a new platform (organic or not) and the process would be no different from waking up in the morning or being revived on the surgeon's gurney.
Just... Whyever would whether the original lives or dies matter for the consciousness of your new brain?
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It wouldn't matter a bit for the new platform and copied consciousness, only the original. If the original is still around, then there are two separate conscious states which will experience the world differently from the point of end-copy on. In order to continue the original consciousness, the original platform must cease.
So... If you make a copy... And it happens exactly as the old platform dies... There is somehow a "transfer"... But if the old platform remains, this doesn't happen. Correct?
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If the original consciousness remains, then the duplicated consciousness is a new entity because it will immediately begin to develop separately. If the originating consciousness expires, then the duplicated consciousness becomes the only entity. It's not strictly necessary to expire the originating platform--it could be recycled or repurposed.
But even if someone copied your brain, I am sure you don't believe that brain would use your consciousness?
Depends what you mean by that, honestly.
In the case I put forwards above, I suspect it would still be 'me', at least, as much as I would still be me you after any significant successful brain surgery(probably a it more). Again, what I am discussing, is not whole brain replacement, but repair to specific regions.
On the discussion between you and Andrew.
What is this "you", that your writing about?
If a new consciousness is formed at the moment of my death, which thinks as I do, shares every one of my skills, memories and feeling ect.
in every practical sense it is me, and it is me, in the way that matters most, it's perception.
I really don't mind much that this instance of me is dead, if that instance of me wakes up shortly there after. So far as I am concerned, that is me.
I'll go a step further and say that, in all practical senses that a copy of me, that is made while I am still alive, and which is active while I am alive, is ALSO me.
Now, with time, just as I am no longer the same person I was when I was seven, It will become less 'me', but so will I.
Okay. Does anything other than making a copy need to happen for the so-called transfer to happen? Do you need a machine? What would this machine do? Or can this happen at a distance without a machine? What distance?
Okay. Does anything other than making a copy need to happen for the so-called transfer to happen? Do you need a machine? What would this machine do? Or can this happen at a distance without a machine? What distance?
Based on my current understanding and speculation...
So long as the copy of the physical structure is accurate, you would still need a way of initiating the state vectors of thought at the point the copy was made.
For that, we are almost certainly talking nano-machine triggers on the neurons to start them firing, as they there firing in the moment of the copy.
Not sure 'transfer' is a good term. Certainly information is copied and paste'd into the new processing/storage medium. But transfer is a term which can Imply so essential spark. It is quasi-religion. I don't really believe that there is such an essential spark to be transferred in the first place, but Information certainly would need to be.
edit:
On the subject of distance, distance is a constraint, as the signal has to be sent intact across the intervening. But planet wide via fiber optics is certainly conceivable
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Well, at this point I know of no current viable technology that can do any of what we're talking about. I imagine there must be some kind of machine interface; in fact, my imagination is too limited to conceive of any method to transfer mapping other than by machine interface, whether it's mechanically obvious or not. Even wireless activity requires some sort of machine interface directing data movement. I suppose I can imagine exactly mapped platforms (say organic) that might be linked on the quantum scale and allow for unlimited distance immediate transfers. I suppose this might be how a future matter teleportation device might work.
@Zombieneighbors, when I say transfer I mean the word as defined by information science, not mysticism.
Well, at this point I know of no current viable technology that can do any of what we're talking about. I imagine there must be some kind of machine interface; in fact, my imagination is too limited to conceive of any method to transfer mapping other than by machine interface, whether it's mechanically obvious or not. Even wireless activity requires some sort of machine interface directing data movement. I suppose I can imagine exactly mapped platforms (say organic) that might be linked on the quantum scale and allow for unlimited distance immediate transfers. I suppose this might be how a future matter teleportation device might work.
@Zombieneighbors, when I say transfer I mean the word as defined by information science, not mysticism.
I get that. But it is a term that others might misunderstand.
Information your senses gather goes into your brain, making you experience it. Decisions you make are expressed through your motor neurons. I would say that no matter how much like you someone else is, to you it would still be like seeing someone else see, think and act like you. That is why I would never enter a Star trek style teleporter. Sure, there would be a Sissyl2 copy of me, which would consider itself to be me, with all my memories... but Sissyl1, me, would be dissolved and die. From the outside, sure, dear old Sissyl would be alive and well... until she too walked into the sparkles. I have not yet seen any argument for why this would not happen. Note that I am not talking about souls.
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Information your senses gather goes into your brain, making you experience it. Decisions you make are expressed through your motor neurons. I would say that no matter how much like you someone else is, to you it would still be like seeing someone else see, think and act like you. That is why I would never enter a Star trek style teleporter. Sure, there would be a Sissyl2 copy of me, which would consider itself to be me, with all my memories... but Sissyl1, me, would be dissolved and die. From the outside, sure, dear old Sissyl would be alive and well... until she too walked into the sparkles. I have not yet seen any argument for why this would not happen. Note that I am not talking about souls.
You may not be talking about souls, but it certainly sounds like your talking about something similar.
Say that you are sedated for the process.
Assuming that the copy is perfect, and you both awaken at the same time place, with no evidence of which of you is the "real" you. How do sissyl1 know she is Sissyl1? More over, does it matter that she is Sissyl1, if she is not certain of it? If it does, why does it.
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I think that's exactly what happens.
The only way, using QM, for teleportation to work--and using QM is the only way teleportation could work--is to destroy the original. The odd Star Trek episode, fun as it is, where there are accidentally two Rikers, one that was copied before being broken down, beamed as data, and reconstituted from ambient available particles, is impossible because the complete copy process, down to the quantum scale, would have to destroy the original.
Because I don't believe in a mystical consciousness platform (call that a soul if you want), and I'm willing to assume a future technology would be exact enough to be as unnoticeable as an eyeblink or light two-second doze during an afternoon board meeting, I'm not at all concerned with the destruction of the original platform and its associated collection of data points, otherwise known as my consciousness.
Well, Sissyl1 knows she isn't Zombieneighbours, for example. It's her eyes that give her sight, it's her arms that respond when she moves them. Not someone else's. That's what I call consciousness. Her brain is connected only to her body. There is no "soul" or anything, but it's only the function of Sissyl1's brain that makes everything she calls herself possible. Sissyl1 would not consider a copy of her to BE her. As you say, if she was still alive when the copy was made, her life and Sissyl2's lives would diverge. If she died when Sissyl2 was made, well, that's also a pretty big divergence.
By the way... say the same scenario, Zombieneighbours1 is copied and dies, making the copies Zombieneighbours2 AND Zombieneighbours3. Which of them will Zombieneighbours1 become?
Both.
With two copies simultaneously made from the original, neither can be the acceptable continuation of the original but should be considered two new individuals with shared pre-copy memories.
Why?
They are separate conscious certainly, but I am not sure how that makes them any less an 'acceptable continuation of zombieneighbours1' Zombieneighbours2 and Zombieneighbours3 may not be each other, but they are just as much Zombieneighbours1 as one another.
edit: You need no pardon for highlander quotes.
Andrew: But if there is only one, then somehow, this is sensed (by what?) and a "transfer" is made? Why can two copies be considered "two new individuals with shared pre-copy memories" when one isn't?
Zombieneighbours: Does Zombieneighbours1 then "control" both 2 and 3? See what both of them see?
I liked the part in Accelerando where Ms. Mancx and her boy (Pierre?) swapped gender roles (and bodies) to do it.
Goblins download their consciousnesses in order to do it in space!
Define control.
The instance of conciousness we are labeling Zombieneighbours1, has stopped running.
It doesn't exist to control anything.
However, if Zombieneighbours1 work up in the place of Zombieneighbours2, there behaviours would be as functionally identical, as two instances of Zombieneighbours2 waking up in the same location, under the same conditions.
Same goes for Zombieneighbours1 waking up in the same position as Zombieneighbours3.
However the behaviours of Zombieneighbours2 and Zombieneighbours3 are going to be slightly, or even markedly different on waking, because the stimuli are going to be different. That said, swap their positions and they will also swap their behaviours.
so, Zombieneighbours1 controls Zombieneighbours2 and Zombieneighbours3 is as much as Zombieneighbours2 and Zombieneighbours3, are Zombieneighbours1, But Zombieneighbours1 holds no power over them from beyond the grave.
At the risk of breaking some fundimental law of the Paizo boards, I am going to partially agree with an anklebiter post, by saying Accelerando is a fun read, including the kinky(for some very transhuman values of kinky) sex.
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If there were a million simultaneous copies spread across the Milky Way, each copy would believe itself the only copy and the only continuation of the original unless informed otherwise. Each copy would 'awake' sharing the last memory of the original. But at the moment of awakening, when the first new mapping would occur, each copy everywhere in the galaxy would begin an experiential development separate from one another and yielding a million new people. Because an individual can only be responsible for himself (intrinsically), we could only say that an individual continued so long as there could be found but a single interacting form of that individual. As soon as there are two or more, they are individuals distinct unto themselves, and the original is fully expired.
With this philosophy, I can imagine an interesting scenario wherein an individual deliberately makes multiple copies of himself, expires (the originating form), and now can't be held responsible for actions prior to the copy process, since with multiple copies there is no longer a continuation of the original.
To be honest, the discussion is pretty much moot. As far as we know, we can't ever measure the exact positions of every relevant part of a brain well enough. Star trek uses a nifty device called Heisenberg compensators to do this. No, I am not kidding you. IF a solution exists, it is so far into the future that we're certainly not going to see it happen to us.
Building replacement units for our neurons gradually through nanotech, though, requires only technology we might actually see happen. It is the only vaguely realistic option for clinical immortality I have seen. It gives us the option to replace the rest of the body with printed organs, or go full cyborg if we choose. To be certain, it is only a theoretical construct now, though.
But philosophically: A copy does not mean you live on.
To be honest, the discussion is pretty much moot. As far as we know, we can't ever measure the exact positions of every relevant part of a brain well enough. Star trek uses a nifty device called Heisenberg compensators to do this. No, I am not kidding you. IF a solution exists, it is so far into the future that we're certainly not going to see it happen to us.
Building replacement units for our neurons gradually through nanotech, though, requires only technology we might actually see happen. It is the only vaguely realistic option for clinical immortality I have seen. It gives us the option to replace the rest of the body with printed organs, or go full cyborg if we choose. To be certain, it is only a theoretical construct now, though.
But philosophically: A copy does not mean you live on.
Not sure I can agree there. There is to my knowledge, no evidence that there is something quantum going on with the brain. Without evidence that it is the case, and with a theoretical framework that appears to not to need it, there is no reason to believe something quantum is going on with consciousness(unless your especially wed to the idea of free will).
As such, I think it is reasonable to say, that in principle, yes we can accurately map both physical structure and state vestors.
Well, objectively, I could claim that a robot that looked like you and behaved in a way that was consistent with what I expected you to behave like WAS you, and that "you" lived on through it after I shot you dead. I doubt you would consider things the same way. So, we aren't talking objectively, but subjectively. That makes things a bit more tricky.
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Well, objectively, I could claim that a robot that looked like you and behaved in a way that was consistent with what I expected you to behave like WAS you, and that "you" lived on through it after I shot you dead. I doubt you would consider things the same way. So, we aren't talking objectively, but subjectively. That makes things a bit more tricky.
If said robot achieves the illusion of being me, by having a perfect copy of everything that makes me, me, and runnning it on an accurate digital emulation, of my neurology, without interferance, then actually I would agree that I live on through that robot.
If it does it by being an expert system, with a sufficiently good emulation of theory of mind to make you utterly believe that It is Me, then to you, I will live on, but to Me I will not live on, because there will be no version of me experiencing being me.
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But philosophically: A copy does not mean you live on.
Philosophically, if a person survives something, like a stroke, that completely rewires their brain, removing all previous memories, would you consider that to be the same person?
Physically it is, obviously.
But the consciousness that previously inhabited it is gone forever.
No. I say that their consciousness has CHANGED. I don't see the problem.
But philosophically: A copy does not mean you live on.
You are already a copy. Most of your original cells have died off and been replaced by their daughters.
Pulling back from the philosophical precipice, I doubt I'll make it past 65. Then again, my father, a life-long chronic alcoholic and chain-smoker, make it to 61 or 62. Since I've never smoked and I drink sparingly...I probably won't see 55. :P
Edit: I am hereby starting a petition to change the title of this thread to "To what age do you expect to live?"
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A copy, of a copy, of a copy, of a copy, of a pair of partial copies even ;)
Edit: I am hereby starting a petition to change the title of this thread to "To what age do you expect to live?"
That's my job.
Edit: I am hereby starting a petition to change the title of this thread to "To what age do you expect to live?"That's my job.
My apologies. :)
This is English, not Latin! I have shed my compunctions about ending sentences with prepositions.
It is just something you will have to deal with ;)
This is the sort of bloody nonsense up with which I will not put.
No. I say that their consciousness has CHANGED. I don't see the problem.
It's the memories that define us as individuals. You don't hang out with your friends body (unless you're a goblin), you're hanging out with the consciousness inhabiting that body. That consciousness is delineated by their memories, that's how we identify one consciousness against another.
Imagine we had body swapping technology. How would you identify someone as being truly themselves? By checking their finger prints or an iris scan?
[bubble bubble bubble]
Oh, man... This is hard to explain. But let me try. I do not agree that memories are what define being "me" to ourselves. Rather, it is the simple fact that we see and hear what happens around us through these eyes and these ears. It is that we move this body, and not another. It is our own point of view that matters, the subjective sense of being. Many describe it as "'I' is what is sitting inside my head, looking out through the eyes". THIS is the point of view that I would call our consciousness. No matter if we lose our memories, the same point of view remains. No matter if we are hit by a stroke and can no longer talk, the same sense of being stays. It is what we lose when we are UNconscious, such as sleeping, during a seizure, or anesthesized, and what we regain when we come back. It is, simply put, the thing that defines what sensory input we get, and what body we can control.
THIS is what we can't "transfer" without treknobabble technology, no matter how many copies we make.
It is an entirely subjective sensation, very difficult to discuss, but probably, to my thinking, built up by continuous self-reference in understanding the world, finding one thing only remaining constant: Our own bodies. An effect of object constance, as we learn it.
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Eh, a bit of brain trauma and/or chemical imbalance and the "you" you're describing isn't "you" anymore, so I still maintain there's no permanent magic "self" outside of a transient collection of current memories and neural pathways.
The "me" tomorrow will be merely similar to, but not the same as, the "me" of today, and the "me" of 10 years from now will be even less similar, and I'm okay with that.
As I said: It changes. Our behaviour changes. Our self changes. It does not disappear, though. If someone told you that you'd be tortured next year, would you say "Ah, let's not worry about it, the me that exists now will have become someone else by then anyway"?
As I said: It changes. Our behaviour changes. Our self changes. It does not disappear, though. If someone told you that you'd be tortured next year, would you say "Ah, let's not worry about it, the me that exists now will have become someone else by then anyway"?
Our behavior isn't the only thing that changes -- events can be changed, too. Ideally, I'd like to prevent torture to anyone, if given some way to foresee it and a means of preventing it. And if it's someone else very close to me now, or fairly close to me later (the future "other me"), emotion would unavoidably give impetus to that urge.
So, has anyone read Zelazny's Creatures of Light and Darkness? Large parts of it are quite germane to this discussion. He seems to come down more on the Sissyl side of things than on mine, but maybe still more on ZN's than Sissyl's.
(I'm more in agreement with Masahiro Mori's stance, as outlined in The Buddha in the Robot).
People in my family (both sides) tend to live a long time... unfortunately, they also tend to turn into mean sumb%~&!es.
... so, there's that.